PackerNation Perspective

Harlan Delays Retirement...."Management Issues" sidetrack Jones

2007-05-28T10:11:19Z

A stunning and unexpected move happened this weekend when 70 year old Bob Harlan essentially sacked his hand picked replacement as President, John Jones. According to stories in the JSO, some "management issues" had kind of really come into focus in the last three weeks (the draft? Favre's little Randy Rant?) and Harlan just felt like he hadn't left the franchise in good shape with Jones at the helm. So, he'll stay on why they try to find a new guy.

A member of the PackerNation Discussion Group had a pretty good take on the whole thing.

Simply put the recent confusion at 1265 Lombardi Avenue is not good. Not good at all. There’s no way to positively spin John Jones’ last minute expulsion. I initially gave Harlan the benefit of the doubt because there was a chance Jones went from capable to incapable of leading the franchise as a result of his heart attack. Harlan assures us that is not the case, but there’s still a sliver of a chance it is. But would Harlan be honest about the situation if that were the case?

However, Harlan did convincingly deny it so if Jones’ ouster was not due to health reasons but rather due to “management issues” as we are being told, Paul Jadin tells us (from the JSOnline article), "My perception is that there was a culture shock there…. The change from Bob to John was stark. I just don't think that anyone there was prepared to go from Bob to John in terms of personality. That was apparent to me."

Asked how the two differed in style and personality, Jadin said he would only speak about Harlan.

"Bob was nurturing," Jadin said. "He saw the Packers as an extension of his family. John, a little less so."

We can read this in a few different ways. Perhaps Harlan just misjudged Jones from the beginning and it took him from February, 1999 to sometime in the first quarter of 2007 to figure that out and then panic at nearly the last minute. That’s not good.

Perhaps as he got closer and closer to leading the franchise, Jones changed the way he interacted with the staff. This is perhaps the best scenario for the Packers IMO but like the possibility above calls into question Harlan’s judgment about Jones after being associated with him closely for more than eight years. If Harlan made a mistake in choosing Jones it’s a bigger error than promoting Sherman to GM IMO. But at least he caught this one in time and it’s better than the next possibility.

Another way to read this is the Packers’ staff is a collection of insecure souls who need to be nurtured like teenagers rather than treated like business associates. If that’s the case, the new Chairman and CEO better be prepared to do some firing of his own. An even worse possibility is that Jones would be fine but a collection of employees wants to undermine him immediately for their own reasons. If that’s the case, again the new boss should begin by firing and hiring… not a great way to endure oneself to their new staff.

This is not good but it’s far from a fatal blow to the franchise – not that anyone is suggesting that. In fact some good can come out of this situation. The Executive Committee, according to the JSOnline story a “powerful and influential body of CEOs and other professionals” which made the decision to begin the process of casting Jones out, can now ensure that a comprehensive search be done for the next CEO and Chairman. I have implored the Packers in the past when a GM or HC or assistant coaching position opened to conduct a comprehensive search for the best possible candidate. Unfortunately, more often than not, that’s not what happens. But we can hope that the “powerful and influential body of CEOs” can make it happen this time.

Mike Reinfeldt may be the best guy for the job. Hell, he probably hasn’t even had time to unpack boxes from his recent move to Tennessee, so it would at least be convenient for him. But I hope the search for the next leader of the franchise isn’t restricted to just those who have a current or previous “tie” to the franchise. There’s no magic in that. The great Bart Starr and the (IMO embarrassing as) HC Forrest Gregg had the strongest of ties and neither worked as HC in Green Bay. And, oh yeah, the guy they named the street mentioned above after had no previous ties and he did quite well. So throw Reinfeldt’s name into the hat if you think he belongs, but don’t give him the slightest advantage because of “ties”. Just pick the best damn guy for the job. BTW, no need to give Bob Harlan’s vote the slightest notice. Sorry, Bob.

This is a public relations black eye for the franchise and the timing of it could be worse, but not by a whole lot. The closer the reality of what’s going on at 1265 Lombardi Avenue is to the ‘new and not improved’ perception this creates, the more important the job of the Executive Committee in picking it’s, and the franchise’s new leader. Interview every good candidate you can identify without restriction. Time isn’t of the essence - you don’t have to find the new guy in a couple of weeks, but don’t dawdle either. Bob Harlan, although he’s made a couple of substantial mistakes, has served this franchise well. But it’s time for him to go, too.

Careful QBs = winning QBs in the playoffs

2007-05-02T17:16:03Z

We started pondering the Lord of Postseason Stats, the one figure to which all other playoff football statistics must bow and worship and beg mercy, during a Fox NFL pregame show last year.

Co-host Terry Bradshaw, the former Pittsburgh quarterback and four-time Super Bowl champion, was interviewing New England quarterback Tom Brady, a three-time Super Bowl champion.

The Disco Era king of NFL quarterbacks launched a rather interesting question at the current king of NFL quarterbacks. Bradshaw asked Brady if he’d rather throw multiple touchdowns in a game or no interceptions.

Well, you know what most fans and many quarterbacks would say. They’d want to light up the scoreboard with a high-powered aerial assault. The QB would get their face on the highlight reels that night and the fans would get a big woody because it pads their fantasy stats.

But Brady gave the correct, but less obvious, answer.

Brady said he’d be happier with a no-INT performance. In fact, he was rather adamant about it. Bradshaw, a fair big-game QB in his day, nodded his head in knowing agreement.

It turns out that Brady and Bradshaw know something that routinely gets overlooked in a pigskin culture that covets the stat-padding TD pass. While it’s obviously important to score points, it’s far more important to hold onto the ball, especially in the pressure-packed playoffs.

In fact, the Crowned Prince of NFL Analysis, the Cold, Hard Football Facts, shows us that QBs who avoid throwing INTs are more successful in the postseason than QBs who toss touchdown passes.

And, it turns out, the QBs who are the very best at holding onto the ball are also the very best postseason QBs in NFL history.

The Building Block of Dynasties

The TD vs. INT question comes into focus this week as New England steps on the field with an opportunity to set an NFL record with its 10th consecutive postseason victory.

The Patriots currently share the record of nine straight playoff victories with Vince Lombardi’s Packers, who won all nine postseason games they played from 1961 to 1967.

Why, in the entire history of the NFL, were these two teams the only ones able to reel off nine straight wins against tough postseason competition?

Great coaching? Of course

Tough defenses? Certainly.

Distinct home-field advantage? No doubt.

But the secret – the Stat that Lords Over All Others – is that the quarterbacks of these two teams simply did not throw interceptions in the playoffs.

Brady and Green Bay's Bart Starr (pictured here) are the two most successful quarterbacks in postseason history. Brady, entering this weekend, has gone 9-0 in his postseason career. Starr went 9-1.

What do Brady and Starr have in common? Sure, they were each the 199th pick in the draft. But more importantly for our purposes, they rank No. 1 and No. 2, respectively, in lowest postseason interception rate in NFL history.

Brady has thrown just 3 INTs in 304 postseason pass attempts, a rate of 0.99 percent.
Starr threw just 3 INTs in 213 postseason pass attempts, a rate of 1.41 percent.
For the record, former N.Y. Giants quarterback Phil Simms ranks third, with 6 INTs in 279 postseason pass attempts, a rate of 2.15 percent.

Brady, Starr and Simms might not have the gaudiest quarterbacking stats in NFL history. But they played in six Super Bowls among the three of them and won all six. In five of those Super Bowls, they were the game’s Most Valuable Player. The three quarterbacks combined to throw just two INTs in their six Super Bowl appearances.

(Starr, by the way, appeared in just four Pro Bowls during his 16-year Hall of Fame career, but in the postseason there was no one better. He remains the highest-rated playoff passer in NFL history, with a rating of 104.8.)

We Want Zeroes, Not Heroes

That number 3 sure looks nifty in the TD column the day after the game. But the number you really want to see in the quarterback’s box score – at least if you value winning – is a big fat "0" next to the letters "INT."

We looked at every single playoff game – all 356 – in the Super Bowl Era. Now, every football fan knows that there is a direct correlation between turnovers and losses. The more you turn the ball over, the more likely you are to lose. But they may not know that it’s actually more important not to throw INTs than it is to throw TDs.

Teams that toss more TD passes than their opponents have won 189 playoff games to just 55 losses (.775 winning percentage).
Teams that toss fewer interceptions than their playoff opponents have won 239 games to just 48 losses (.833 winning percentage).

The breaking point seems to be two INTs. If you throw fewer than two INTs, your odds of winning are fairly strong. But once a quarterback throws that second interception, his odds of winning drop dramatically.

Teams that toss fewer than two INTs have gone 293-141 (.675) in the postseason during the Super Bowl Era.
Teams that toss two or more INTs have gone 63-215 (.227) in the postseason during the Super Bowl Era.

Here’s a breakdown of how teams have fared in the postseason based on the number of INTs they’ve thrown:

INTs	Record	Winning %
0	166-44	.790
1	127-97	.567
2	48-103	.318
3	14-73	.161
4	1-26	.037
5	0-10	.000
6	0-3	.000

Only one team in the Super Bowl Era has managed to win after tossing more than three INTs in a playoff game. That team was the 1981 Bills, who earned a 31-27 wildcard victory over the N.Y. Jets. But there’s a very good reason why the Bills were able to overcome this dreadful four-INT performance by Joe Ferguson: Jets quarterback Richard Todd also tossed four INTs that day.

Legends Skewered on and Saved by the Sword of INTs

Fans routinely come up with reasons why some great quarterbacks were not able to win in the postseason.

Take, for example, the case of former Dolphins quarterback Dan Marino, who still stands as one of the most productive players in history and continues to hold numerous passing records. Marino's supporters say he did not win a Super Bowl because he had no defense and no running game and had to carry the team himself. But that wasn’t the reason why Marino never won a Super Bowl.

Marino never won a Super Bowl because he habitually threw interceptions in the playoffs. Marino played in 18 postseason games in his career. He posted an 8-10 mark in those 18 games.

When Marino threw fewer than 2 INTs, the Dolphins were 7-1.
When Marino threw 2 INTs or more, the Dolphins were just 1-9.

Now consider the case of Joe Namath, who is best remembered for guaranteeing a victory over the Baltimore Colts in Super Bowl III and going on to win the game’s Most Valuable Player award. Namath won the award not for what he did on the field that day, but for what he did not do: He did not throw a single touchdown. But nor did he throw a single interception.

Nobody remembers that Namath failed to find the end zone with his golden arm that day. All they remember is that he lifted his team to the biggest upset in NFL history. He lifted his team because, if for no other reason, he kept the ball out of the hands of the Baltimore defense.

His Colts counterparts, Earl Morrall and Johnny Unitas, were picked off four times that day. The 1968 Colts entered that game as the most dominant team of the Super Bowl Era. But even their historic dominance was not enough to overcome those four interceptions on a day when the opposing quarterback failed to throw even one.

If Namath throws four INTs that day, the Jets lose, the Colts go down as one of the great teams in NFL history and Namath today is not in the Pro Football Hall of Fame.

All people would have remembered is that he couldn't win the big game.

Packer People?

2007-05-01T04:58:24Z

Ted Thompson and Mike McCarthy started using this word around the time he was hired. What does it mean? Does it mean anything? Is there really any substance to it, or is it just kind of a feel good PR term? Some thoughts from members of the PackerNation Discussion Group:

Stargazr:

I think character flags come into play when someone is looking at "investing" a draft pick on the player. The higher the pick, the higher the risk and vice versa. It also comes into play wrt the organization and coaching staff's ability to handle the character issues. I don't think "Packer People" means these are guys with no skeletons (or in the case of Davenpoop, well you know where I'm going...) in their closets. I think it means they are tough, football smart, know how to play the game and perform well in our current scheme. And they will "behave" in the Packers' locker room and in the community. "Behave" I think means that the organization can "control" their behavior such that they don't violate the league conduct policy and to the extent possible the substance abuse policy. And on field talent trumps some past issues if the team believes they can control that player. Especially with late draft choices and rookie FA's who can be cut with little or no loss.

I think someone like a player we didn't trade for would have stretched the limits of the definition of "Packer People" because his history says at some point he will make more than one stupid comment or take one or more stupid action that will hurt team chemistry and/or violate team or league policy. But he's known to be a competitor, he works out, stays in shape and is a football player "when he feels like being one" (that's where I think the boundary would really stretch). I think TT and MM believe they have above average ability to control team chemistry and team/league policy within the Packer organization and the community. And I think they get rid of "bad actors" when they begin to get in the way. I think of Carroll, Roman, Thomas, Hunt as examples in recent past. I think they'll put up with some issues if the performance justifies the hastle to maintain control. But when it's obvious their play is not worth it and/or they go public with complaints, the line has been crossed and they're gone.

I don't think TT and MM are being hypocritical with their statements about "Packer People". They know this league and know it's a balancing act with these players. Throw millions of dollars at 20 year olds and you're very lucky if a few of them don't handle it well. Talk about herding cats... I thing they know there is a distribution curve associated with character and players. I think they try to skew the curve to the good character side and try to minimize the outliers.

Are there some guys with bad or questionable character on the Packers? Yes, just like every other team. The level of distraction it causes is what determines if they remain on the team or are out the door.

PackerNation:

The whole "Packer People" thing.....I think it just means different things to different people. To me, it's tough, smart, high-energy, hard-working, solid-citizen type guys who'll rise to the occasion. I'm sure it means other things to other people.

I don't want the Randy Moss types, or the Ray Lewis types, or the PacMan Jones types. I'm not saying you have to be a Boy Scout to have decent character, either. The dudes who landed on the beach at Iwo Jima weren't Boy Scouts but they sure as hell had character.

Bizarro2:

The "Packer People" debate is a fairly difficult one, imho. I imagine that the team is ultimately comprised of decent people who are phenomenal athletes, but in the end I also know that I am susceptible, as a foolhearted fan, to ill-advised views toward players due to financial investments and minimal returns--or returns that I perceive to be inadequate.

How am I to judge these things...how am I to know these things as actual verifiable truths? I can't. Therein lies a paradox of sorts. The media believes one thing, or is prompted to endorse a certain (often company-specific) viewpoint...or so it seems...and we are told certain things or our culture reacts toward certain things that are often highly disputable in my opinion. Thus, when I look at the label "Packer Player" I see it as mythologized as much as the Ice Bowl itself. I want decent people. I want talented hardworkers. I want leaders. Yet, the NFL is a business and big business has one constant: success or perish. Thus, character is ultimately moot to a certain degree.

I didn't want Moss. However, this had nothing to do with a character issue. As a 'character' he is highly engaging, bold, and upfront...however, as a player and a teammate he is the consummate asshole. Having played DI athletics I am often ashamed by players who make themselves bigger than the game though it is typically players with the utmost of talent that can get away with this. Along with Moss's questionable (at best) commitment to team comes the nagging questions of 2 past years of under-performing tendencies on a team that was terrible on offense. However, regardless of whether it was the talent in Oakland, he did not step up as a leader...he did not play his hardest, and he quit. That fails my idea of a good teammate.

When I look at the pick of Clowney I can honestly avow that I am infinitely more excited to see him play in mini camp and training camp than I am to see the "myth" of the "great" Randy Moss overshadow the remainder of the team's development...well except Favre of course. That is why I am a fan. That is why I like Ted Thompson. I like athletes that are given a chance and rise to the top. Whether this translates to wins or losses is almost rendered meaningless. Randy Moss has been given too many chances and that has a lot to do with character but it has more to do with the team.

Stargazr:

Biz...I've just seen some comments about how "packer people" is a somewhat hypocritical statement and that some of the players TT has considered bringing to Green Bay is proof that he doesn't practice what he preaches. I just think it's a very gray area and open for wide interpretation. I've had teammates quit on teams I've played on as well and it's unproductive all around. Some players respond by lowering their play to the level of the player or players who have let the team down. Some try to overcompensate, press and take themselves out of their normal game.

We have at least one questionable "packer people" from this draft. Wynn underachieved at Florida. You could argue he let his team and coaches down by not performing to the level of his talents. And apparently his coaches said as much from what I've read. TT drafted him and they'll see if they can motivate him. The difference between TT and a previous GM is that he'll take the character risks in round 7 and FA where the investment is low. On the other end of the spectrum, you can look at Harrell, someone who has been oft injured but felt the need to lead his team as a senior despite a very painful and debilitating injury for his position. High character for sure (and maybe an injury risk). And it's clear TT valued his talent and performance and his character over the risk of injury.

To me the term "packer people" is really PR, marketing, maybe a "vision statement" for the organization to build around. So when I hear someone in the organization say it, that's all it is to me. It's like saying our mission as a business is "to provide the best service to our customer and provide the greatest value to our shareholders." Pretty vague until you break it down to specific qualities and initiatives you expect from your organization and people throughout. And ultimately actions speak louder than any slogans.

If this team gels, grows and plays well together I'll say TT has fulfilled his vision. If we end up like the Bengals, I'll say he's failed. At the same time the vision must include championship quality organization and play. So, he will also have failed if we live in mediocrity during his tenure.

Believe me, I'll take Clowney and Jones any day over Moss, Ginn and even some of the other second tier WR's like Sydney Rice, Allison, etal. They appear to be good fits for the WCO. They aren't household names and they aren't as sexy as Moss or some of the other high profile receivers. But Jones looks the part of a very good possession type receiver. And Clowney looks like he can stretch the field and has been described as tough as anyone pound for pound.

For the most part, I'd say TT has been pretty consistent, has a plan and is sticking to it. I don't think less of him or his plan because he considered taking in Moss if he thought he could help the team and not destroy it's chemistry. Trust me, I didn't want Moss. I even called Harlan to tell him. And Harlan told me it hadn't even been discussed. In the end, it obviously was. Did it bother me that Harlan played the company line card? Yes, a little. But I also understand this is a business and I would hope that Harlan and the rest of the organization wouldn't tell me or anyone else outside the organization what they're actually doing. So I hope they'll continue to talk in generalities like "packer people". Let people decide what it means to them. But do what it takes to build a winning team without putting the convict team from "The Longest Yard" on the field.

370 Carries In A Season Wears Out Your Running Back

2007-04-26T15:52:30Z

This is a fine article that appeared in footballoutsiders.com that, IMO, clearly shows that when a running back has a big carry season (370 or more), he's almost certainly done being a premiere back in the league. I'd encourage you to read this 2007 follow up and also take the link to the original article that appeared in 2004.

Here it is:

370 Carries Revisited

1/1/2007

by Aaron Schatz

All season long, when talking about Shaun Alexander’s problems, you’ve seen us refer to the “Curse of 370.” You’ve also seen that term as we tracked Larry Johnson’s high number of carries all season long. Now that Johnson has set the NFL record with 416 carries in the regular season, the “Curse of 370″ is showing up in everything written by Football Outsiders.

We wanted to help those who were new to our site understand the Curse of 370, which is something we’ve been writing about for three years. The first article about 370 carries appeared in the book Pro Football Forecast 2004, and was also published on our site when Ricky Williams retired in July 2004. You’ll find that article here. A sequel article appeared in the Seattle chapter of Pro Football Prospectus 2006, and it is republished in its entirety below.

Just so people understand, there’s nothing magical about carry number 370 that makes a running back blow out his ACL, any more than there is something special about pitch 100 that makes a pitcher’s arm fall off. It’s simply a useful shorthand to represent the fact that overworking your running back with too many carries is a bad thing. The punishment gets worse and worse with more carries, and 370 is a close approximation of the tipping point.

Since we began doing football research a few years ago, we’ve developed a number of axioms that tend to come up over and over again, both on our Web site and in Pro Football Prospectus. With both Shaun Alexander and Edgerrin James entering free agency this off-season, one precept in particular got a lot of attention: the 370-carry theory.

The 370-carry theory is generally summarized as follows: “A running back with 370 or more carries during the regular season will usually suffer either a major injury or loss of effectiveness the following year, unless he is named Eric Dickerson.”

Some recent examples of the 370-carry theory in action include Curtis Martin’s collapse last year [i.e. 2005], Jamal Lewis’s struggles for the last two years, and Ricky Williams falling from 4.8 yards per carry in 2002 to 3.5 yards per carry in 2003. Terrell Davis, Jamal Anderson, and James each tore his ACL a year after going over 370 carries. The 370-carry barrier helped destroy the careers of Earl Campbell, Barry Foster, and Gerald Riggs.

But when looking at the question of how much to pay Alexander and James this off-season, the 370-carry theory seemed a bit limited. Why should a running back like James, who is used so much in the passing game, have his workload be defined solely by carries without considering receptions? And why should our count end before the playoffs, when Alexander added another 20 carries per game through the Super Bowl?

Let’s examine each question in turn. The first issue is whether “touches” are a better measure of workload than carries, with touches equaling the total of each back’s carries and receptions for a given year. From 1978 through 2004, 60 running backs had seasons of at least 340 carries. Comparing the number of carries for each running back with the number of yards he gained the following year gives us a correlation coefficient of -.24. In other words, as players carry the ball more, they are less likely to run for as many yards the following year, due to a mixture of lost effectiveness and injury. If we want to measure only effectiveness (yards per carry) or playing time (total carries) the correlations are similar.

If we take the same 60 running backs and compare touches to yards the following year, the correlations are roughly half as large. This suggests that carries are a better indicator of workload than touches. Compare just receptions to rushing yards the following year, not even considering carries, and it is clear why: the correlation between receptions and yards the following year is actually positive, albeit tiny. If more receptions indicate anything, it is that a player will gain more yards the following year, in particular more yards per carry.

Correlation between running back usage and year-to-year improvement or decline, 1978-2005
*Minimum 340 carries (60 players)*
Year-to-year change in…	Yards	Yd/Car	Carries
Carries	-.24	-.25	-.22
Touches	-.12	-.09	-.13
Receptions	.06	.12	.02
*Minimum 300 carries and 25 receptions (121 players)*
Year-to-year change in…	Yards	Yd/Car	Carries
Carries	-.17	-.05	-.14
Touches	-.06	.00	-.03
Receptions	.20	.10	.22

Using a larger sample of players not only gives the same result, but makes the correlation between receptions and improvement in rushing yardage more significant. 121 players between 1978 and 2004 had 300 or more carries and 25 or more receptions. For these running backs, the correlation between carries and rushing yardage the next year was -.17, but the correlation between receptions and rushing yardage the next year was .20. That’s two relationships of similar strength in opposite directions.

(The reaction of most statisticians at this point would be that these correlations are extremely small. This is simply a fact of life when talking about the NFL, where so many factors contribute to a player or team’s performance — many of them intangible — that no one factor will have a particularly large impact on its own.)

So if more receptions don’t mean a greater chance of breakdown the following year, what about playoff carries?

This is where we have bad news for Seattle fans. It does look like postseason carries matter, with 390 carries total forming a barrier equivalent to 370 regular-season carries. Above that line, a number of players were either injured or lost effectiveness. And while Shaun Alexander just barely touched the 370-carry barrier, he flew past 390 carries once the Seahawks got into the postseason, ending the playoffs with 430 carries total.

Not counting Alexander, there have been 14 players who did not reach 370 carries in the regular season, but surpassed 390 carries during the postseason. Though some of these players continued to play well the next season and even afterwards, a number of them had major difficulties.

Terrell Davis (1997): 369 carries, 481 including the postseason. The latter total is an NFL record. Davis was spectacular again in 1998, but that season’s total of 392 regular-season carries basically ended his career.

Eddie George (1999): 320 carries, 428 including the postseason. He fell from 4.1 to 3.7 yards per carry in 2000, and after 403 regular-season carries he was never again an effective player.

Curtis Martin (1998): 369 carries, 418 including the postseason. Martin saw no ill effects; 1998 was actually his worst year until 2005.

Thurman Thomas (1993): 355 carries, 418 including the postseason. Thomas continued to play well but never again was able to carry the ball 300 times in a season.

Joe Morris (1986): 341 carries, 414 including the postseason. The following year Morris plummeted from 4.4 to 3.4 yards per carry. By 1989, his career was over due to nerve damage and broken bones in his feet, except for a short-lived comeback with the 1991 Browns.

Jamal Lewis (2000): 309 carries, 412 including the postseason. 103 postseason carries is the third-highest total in history, and Lewis tore his ACL the next year.

Corey Dillon (2005): 345 carries, 410 including the postseason. Fell from 4.7 to 3.5 yards per carry and only managed 12 games due to injuries.

Emmitt Smith (1991): 365 carries, 406 including the postseason. No ill effects.

Ahman Green (2003): 355 carries, 403 including the postseason. Dropped from 5.3 yards per carry in 2003 to 4.5 yards per carry in 2004 and then 3.3 yards per carry in 2005, when he missed 11 games because of injuries.

Earl Campbell (1979): 368 carries, 401 including the postseason. Improved in 1980, when another heavy workload cost him most of his effectiveness in 1981 and beyond.

Natrone Means (1994): 343 carries, 400 including the postseason. Only played 10 games the following year due to injuries, never again played a full season, and retired in 2000 at the age of 28.

Dorsey Levens (1997): 329 carries, 400 including the postseason. Only played seven games in 1998, never again had 100 carries in a season after 1999, didn’t average four yards per carry again until 2002.

Curt Warner (1983): 335 carries, 395 including the postseason. Blew out his knee during the first game of 1984 and was out for the season.

Emmitt Smith (1994): 368 carries, 395 including the postseason. Had his best season in 1995, then declined after that.

To summarize, eight of these 14 players were injured or lost effectiveness the following season. A ninth, Thomas, was still effective and healthy, but lost stamina. Three players, Davis, Campbell, and Smith (1994) had problems two seasons later, after another year of overuse. Only two of these players, Martin and Smith (1991) seemed to have no ill effects for multiple seasons afterwards.

On average, running backs with 300 to 369 carries who do not play in the postseason will see total yards drop by 15 percent the following year, and yards per carry by just two percent. But the 14 players listed above averaged a 27 percent drop in total yards, and a 10 percent drop in yards per carry.

All players with 390 or more carries, no matter how these carries were split between the regular season and the postseason, averaged a 33 percent drop in total yards, and an 11 percent drop in yards per carry.

Alexander’s total of 430 carries between the regular season and the postseason ranks sixth in NFL history, and no other running back last year reached 390 carries combined. Only three other running backs were above 350 carries combined: Clinton Portis (385), Edgerrin James (373), and Tiki Barber (370).

So chalk up another reason to believe that Alexander will decline this year, to go with the Madden Curse, the departure of Steve Hutchinson, and plain old regression to the mean. The Seahawks can live with a little decline — because Alexander played at such a high level last year, a little decline would still leave one of the top running backs in football. What the Seahawks have to worry about is that other problem with overuse: increased chance of injury. If Alexander is hurting and Maurice Morris is starting come midseason, that new contract with $15.1 million in guaranteed bonus and salary for 2006 won’t look like such a good decision.

Packer Draft Grades For the Past Decade

2007-04-25T11:15:30Z

Here's another fine article that I've borrowed from coldhardfootballfacts.com. It's part of a larger article on the draft performance of all the teams in the league. What they did was take the values according to the Trade Value Chart and then show us where we've "spent our money" so-to-speak. Here's the chart.

GREEN BAY PACKERS

Draft focus: Defense (59.34 percent)

Total draft value by position, 1997-2006 (league rank in parentheses)

QB RB
WR
OL
DL
LB
DB

947.6

(21st)

72.5

(32nd)

3472

(13th)

2277.3

(21st)

3282.3

(21st)

3034.4

(7th)

3564.6

(13th)

Pet position: LB
Least concerned with: RB
First-round breakdown: QB, WR, TE, T, 2 DE, 2 LB, 2 CB
Steals: LB Hunter Hillenmeyer (5th round, 2003), DE Aaron Kampmann (5th, 2002), TE David Martin (6th, 2001), DE Kabeer Gbaja-Biamila (5th, 2000), G Mark Tauscher (7th, 2000), QB Aaron Brooks (4th, 1999), WR Donald Driver (7th, 1999), QB Matt Hasselbeck (6th, 1998), CB Mike McKenzie (3rd, 1999), S Darren Sharper (2nd, 1997)

Is the plan working? The Packers haven’t drafted a running back above the third round for the entire Brett Favre era, yet the team has been in the top 11 in the NFL in scoring offense in 12 of Favre’s 15 years. Between Ahman Green (trade), Dorsey Levens (fourth-round pick) and Edgar Bennett (fourth-round pick), Favre has always had someone solid behind him to tote the pigskin. Over the past decade, Green Bay has loaded up on receivers and linemen, and have been able to overcome injury and defection on the offensive side of the ball. Defensively, the draft hasn’t paid off as well, with ranks of 25, 20 and 23 in scoring the last three seasons. First-round busts CB Ahmad Carroll (2004), DE Jamal Reynolds (2001) and S Antuan Edwards (1999) didn’t help.

Summary: The Packers have been incredibly adept on Draught Day, amassing more picks (average of 9.1 per season) than anyone in the NFL and getting a slew of second-day heroes. This production comes despite having less total draft value to work with than most clubs thanks to perennially good teams. The Packers have had just one losing season since 1991, and that’s more a tribute to the front office than it is to Favre.

Overall grade: A-minus

I think that the #5 overall selection of Hawk kind of skews our linebacker score. Personally, I'd spend more resources on running backs and the offensive line, but that's just me.

Actions Speak Louder Than words

2007-04-18T13:22:46Z

I hate to keep stealing stuff from coldhardfootballfacts. Actually, that's not entirely true; I just wish there were more places worth stealing from so it wouldn't look like I'm stealing their stuff exclusively.

Anyway, today's insight is that despite the fact that teams talk the talk about building teams from the trenches out, the reality is that they spend more resources on the players on the edge than they do in the middle. Players who can "play in space", so to speak. So here's today nugget of football wisdom. Enjoy.

Actions speak louder than words

Cold, Hard Football Facts for April 18, 2007

By Kerry J. Byrne

Cold, Hard Football Facts publisher

Most sports fans know that baseball teams are built from the inside out, as major-league organizations seek proverbial “strength up the middle” of the diamond: pitchers and catchers are paramount, followed by center fielders and middle infielders.

You might expect NFL organizations to do the same thing: devote the most resources to the heart of the team and build their offensive and defensive units around a strong inner core.

But they do not.

In fact, quite the opposite: NFL teams are built for combat on the edges of the gridiron, with the inner heart of offensive and defensive units sacrificed everywhere but at quarterback.

It doesn’t seem to make a lot of sense on the surface, but this is exactly the way teams are constructed in the modern NFL – at least if Draught-Day behavior is any indication. Teams covet cornerbacks over safeties; offensive tackles over centers; outside linebackers over middle linebackers; wide receivers over running backs; defensive ends over defensive tackles.

For the third year in a row, we’ve looked at the first-round habits of NFL teams over the past 10 drafts. This simple exercise offers incredible insight into what NFL organizations deem important. What we find, as we so often do when we look only at the Cold, Hard Football Facts, flies in the face of conventional gridiron wisdom.

Here’s a look at the raw numbers of the past 10 drafts, followed by what these numbers tell us.

FIRST-ROUND SELECTIONS (1997-2006)

Position	No. 1 Picks
Cornerback	43
Wide receiver	41
Defensive end	39
Linebacker	35
Running back	30
Defensive tackle*	29
Offensive tackle	27
Quarterback	27
Tight end	14
Safety	13
Guard	11
Center	3
Kicker	1

* includes four nose tackles

Teams are built from the outside-in

Notice something about the most frequently drafted positions? They have words in them like “wide,” “corner” and “end” – players who perform on the outer edges of the gridiron.

Even within individual positions, we notice an unfailing trend: edge players are drafted far more frequently than interior players.

On the offensive line, tackles are taken more often than guards, who are taken more than centers. First-round tackles outnumber first-round centers 9 to 1.
In the secondary, cornerbacks are taken at better than a 3-to-1 rate over safeties.
On the defensive line, ends are taken 34 percent more often than tackles and nose tackles

We also find that ...

Middle linebackers are dinosaurs

The image of the domineering middle linebacker ruling over the football field – the Huff, the Butkus, the Nitschke, the Lambert, the Urlacher – is burnished into the memory of pigskin romantics. But teams in the modern NFL are far more interested in flashy outside linebackers than they are interior linebackers.

We grouped together all linebackers for this exercise, because historic draft data clouds the position: players are pegged as outside linebackers, middle linebackers or inside linebackers, while others are simply listed as linebackers.

But if you look into each individual draft, it’s pretty obvious that outside linebackers are far more coveted than the romanticized middle linebacker – or even its less heralded 3-4 off-shoot, the inside linebacker. Here’s a breakdown of the 35 linebackers taken in the first-round over the past 10 years.

OLB – 21
MLB – 11
ILB – 2
LB – 1

Coaches and conventional wisdom lie

Nobody takes more glee in skewering conventional wisdom than the Cold, Hard Football Facts. And it's pretty obvious that our little exercise here slices up conventional wisdom like a gridiron Ginsu.

Ask a coach at any level and they’ll tell you that “games are won in the trenches” and that strength on the offensive and defensive lines are the foundation of success.

But actions speak louder than words, and these actions roundly refute the words that come out of the mouths of coaches.

Wide receivers, as the Cold, Hard Football Facts have proven, have only a secondary effect on the outcome of a game. And, as first-round draft picks, they have an extraordinarily high rate of failure at the NFL level.

But coaches and GMs just can’t keep their grubby hands off these pigskin prima donnas. They’ve drafted 41 wideouts over the past 10 drafts, more than any other offensive position. (Wide receivers led our list last year, with 45 taken in the 10 drafts from 1996-2005.)

Compare those 41 wideouts taken to the 42 offensive linemen drafted over the same period.

The number of picks devoted to wide receivers and offensive linemen may look even, but they’re wildly distorted: a team generally fields two wide receivers, adding more on a given play as necessary. But a team always fields five offensive linemen. If offensive linemen were given equal billing in the hearts and minds of NFL teams, they’d be selected roughly twice as often as wide receivers.

Bottom line: coaches love to trumpet the importance of building a team to battle in the trenches. But more often than not, their Draught Day actions tell a different story.

Kirwan's Draft Truisms

2007-04-11T13:41:29Z

Pat Kirwan, over at nfl.com, wrote this article on true draft strategies. I think it's pretty good so I'm saving it here in my blog so I can find it whenever I want.

(April 10, 2007) -- No matter how your favorite team stacks its own draft board, no matter what the team needs are and regardless of the free-agent activities surrounding your squad, there are a few unofficial guidelines that I might keep next to me come Draft Weekend.

Each and every draft has a personality of its own and with the expenses surrounding quality free agents, rosters have to be built during the draft. So here are a few things that would be taped inside my draft book for the last weekend in April.

1. Don't take one guy with a character alert: Commissioner Roger Goodell is going to come down hard on the bad guys. The majority of veteran players are fed up with the antics of some of the problem children around the league and no one is talking about how much these players are tearing down the locker room. Four-game suspensions strangle a team because of the 53 man roster limit. I bet Bengals coach Marvin Lewis isn't taking another chance on a guy with first-round talent and has character issues.

2. Look for the medical competitive advantage: Modern medicine is ever changing and teams with an aggressive medical staff are providing general managers with a larger pool of talent to draw from. It's going to be interesting to see which team pulls the trigger on Louisville running back Michael Bush. He was headed toward a first-round grade when injuries side-tracked him. As Chargers GM A.J. Smith said to me last year following the draft, "we listened to our doctors and took the players accordingly." Well, a number of teams failed OT Marcus McNeill because of a narrowing of the spine. But Smith grabbed McNeill at the 50th pick and he went on to start all 16 regular season games on his way to the Pro Bowl.

3. Don't pass on a franchise quarterback: I don't care if your quarterback's name is Tom Brady, Peyton Manning or Donovan McNabb. If a signal-caller is there when you're on the clock, just take him. Look at what the Falcons were able to get in a trade for Matt Schaub. A quarterback is a blue-chip investment. If a team like the Lions pass on a potential franchise QB for the second year in a row and look back a few years from now to see Matt Leinart and Brady Quinn in the Pro Bowl, they will feel the same way the Jets felt when after passing on Hall of Famer Dan Marino. If Oakland had taken Leinart or Jay Cutler last year, it would have been negotiating with Calvin Johnson right now.

4. Identify the top three matchup nightmares and take one: The NFL game has evolved into a chessboard of matchup problems. Whether it's a Reggie Bush in the backfield, or Antonio Gates as a tight end, or a safety with corner skills, every team wants to create more matchup problems for their opponent.

5. Dedicate one early second-day pick on the best special teams player on the board: In a typical NFL game, there are close to 30 special teams plays. They change field positions; sometimes score points and a other times that special player can make a big difference. Don't hesitate to take one of the top three special teams players, especially a returner. The Bears hit a home run last year, selecting Devin Hester with the 57th pick in the draft. Not many of the 56 players chosen before him did more for their teams' success.

6. Always let the game tapes trump the workout in shorts: There always seem to be a workout warrior who rises up the draft boards because of a 4.3-second time in the 40-yard dash or 35 reps on the bench press test. If those numbers are intriguing, then take a look back at the game tapes. Playing speed is a whole lot different than the 40 speed. For example, Dwayne Jarrett ran a slow 4.6 seconds and some believe he has dropped to the second round. The top rated cornerback on most boards is Leon Hall, who ran a 4.39 40. Watch the game tapes to see who looked faster in a football uniform.

7. Trade up or down to get the player you really want and make the deal happen: After all the work done to prepare for a draft, make sure you get the key player you want if your research leads you to him. For example, if Calvin Johnson is the best player on the board and you believe as one head coach said to me this week, "Calvin will play in at least 10 Pro Bowls," then go get him and be a dealmaker. When I was at the Jets we traded up to get Brett Favre and missed by one spot. I hate to think about what the future held for me and everyone in that room if we were able to get to the right spot on that draft day.

8. Sign the two biggest offensive linemen not drafted: There are expanded practice squads and then there is NFL Europa where offensive linemen can develop. I have done it and smart teams are looking to take a guy or two with rare size and a willingness to work. Sign them immediately following the draft and put opening day in 2009 as the target date to play them. With 800 days of structured prep time to teach techniques, develop strength and play 20 games in Europe every spring, should do the trick.

9. Use a pick on an athlete who was a college quarterback to do other things: The 49ers drafted Penn State QB Michael Robinson with the 100th pick last year. He has versatility as a running back, wide receiver, special teams player and he's the third-string QB without worrying about the game rules governing the third QB. There's always a player like Antwaan Randle El out there and every team needs to find one and be willing to develop a package around him. Two potential candidates in this year's draft pool are QBs Paul Thompson of Oklahoma and Syvelle Newton of South Carolina.

10. Use one late pick or compensatory pick on Jeff Samardzija: Sure the Notre Dame clutch receiver signed a big baseball contract, but stranger things have happened. Samardzija caught 179 passes and scored 27 touchdowns. What if he can't get his curveball across the plate? If I draft Brady Quinn, I would surely select Samardzija early on the next day and let Quinn do the recruiting.

11. Listen to the one scout in the draft room who's opinion is contrary to the group: Because everyone in the NFL seems to talk with each other, there are universal opinions about players. Too many times it's just safer to go with the flow and inflate or deflate players like everyone else does. If one of your scouts is willing to stand on the table for a guy, contrary to the group, then listen to him. Risk takers are few and far between in the personnel business and a scout willing to go away from the flow just might know something the rest of the group doesn't know. I remember a Carolina Panther scout begging the team to draft Wayne Chrebet in the seventh round. No one listened and the rest was history.

12. Draft a basketball forward who was a very good high school football player: The NFL rules really can favor a big man with hand-eye coordination as a receiver down the field. Call him a move tight end, a hybrid receiver, or anything you want. No one in NFL history had more success finding athletes to play football like NFL.com's Gil Brandt did back in his glory days of the Dallas Cowboys. The college basketball courts are full of 6-foot-6 athletes who are starting to realize their NBA dreams are never going to happen. If they played high school football, like Antonio Gates did, then the project has a chance. Just like those big offensive line projects, a team has two years to develop a basketball player.

A Smorgasbord of Rib-Ticklers

2007-03-26T16:05:25Z

We've all been to youtube.com and glumbert.com.    I present to you these four offerings.   Turn up your sound and enjoy these.

Offerering #1.   Caliendo as John Madden on the Letterman Show, talking about football and Favre.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r9Xu7zWEbrw

Offering #2.    With all possible apologies in advance to Gloria Gaynor, this music video features Brett Favre footage to the tune of "I Will Survive".    I believe the title of it is "The Final Drive".   Just Flat Out Hilariously Clever.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n6ZBqT_H4Es&NR

Offering #3.   This has nothing to do with football, but I've always liked the song "White Rabbit", and I was once upon a time a Star Trek fan.   And this individual has put together footage from the original Start Trek to the tune of White Rabbit. It's kind of funny.

http://www.glumbert.com/media/whiterabbit

And lastly, just because at heart I think it's really funny listening to people speak Japanese and then getting cracked...really hard....in the balls, I have this offering.    Truth be told, I've watched it dozens of times and it just keeps getting funnier......

http://www.glumbert.com/media/tonguetwister

Why Randy Moss Is Not The Answer For Green Bay

2007-03-24T16:34:54Z

I don't want Randy Moss on the Packers, I'll be upfront honest about that. Even if he still had the skills that made him the league's premiere deep threat I wouldn't want him.....I think there's a reason he's never been a winner at any level. But that's a subject for another day.

What I wanted to share with you today was this little graph courtesy of footballoutsiders.com. They do this little statistical trick of looking at Moss's past three seasons and then comparing him with other players who have a similar profile, age-wise and performance wise. Here's what it looks like:

Similarity scores are a tool used to compare people to other players who posted similar numbers over a given time period. A quick glance at Moss’ three-year similarity profile is very alarming. (Only yards are listed, but similarity scores also compare catches, touchdowns, and average yards per catch.)

Name	Years	Yards Yr 1-3	Age +1	G+1	Rec +1	Yds+1
Randy Moss	2004-06	767, 1005, 553	30	???	???	???
Drew Pearson	1978-80	714, 1026, 568	30	16	38	614
Sam McCullum	1979-81	739, 874, 567	30	11*	21*	233*
James Jett	1997-99	804, 882, 552	30	11	20	356
Freddie Solomon	1980-82	658, 969, 574*	30	13	31	662
Ernie Jones	1990-92	724, 957, 559	29	10	5	56
Nat Moore	1978-80	645, 840, 564	30	13	26	452
Andre Rison	1996-98	593, 1092, 542	32	15	21	218
Webster Slaughter	1990-92	847, 906, 486	29	14	77	904
Antonio Freeman	2000-02	912, 818, 600	31	15	14	141
Ernest Givins	1992-94	787, 887, 521	31	9	29	280
Earnest Gray	1982-84	757*, 1139, 529	28	5	3	22
*(Pro-rated for strike)

You can see that this group of receivers were pretty decent, although not All-World like Moss was in his prime. But I think that you can't look at this and be confident that Moss is still going to be able to bring the magic. As it says in the article, Moss isn't a work-out warrior, isn't a physical receiver, and isn't a great technician. He's succeeded with blinding speed and leaping ability. He's unlikely to age gracefully wherever he goes.

You add that to all his other negatives and I really think that bringing him onboard is a bad, bad plan.

The Loser's Curse

2007-03-19T16:19:51Z

This is an actual scholarly paper written by a Duke University professor. It's long, and has lots of big words, so what I'm going to do is:

1)Post the abstract.
2)Post a link to the entire article
3)Post some excerpts from what our discussion group had said about this article.

As always, you, the reader, will have to decide.

The Abstract:

A question of increasing interest to researchers in a variety of fields is whether the incentives and
experience present in many “real world” settings mitigate judgment and decision-making biases. To
investigate this question, we analyze the decision making of National Football League teams during their
annual player draft. This is a domain in which incentives are exceedingly high and the opportunities for
learning rich. It is also a domain in which multiple psychological factors suggest teams may overvalue the
“right to choose” in the draft – non-regressive predictions, overconfidence, the winner’s curse and false
consensus all suggest a bias in this direction. Using archival data on draft-day trades, player performance
and compensation, we compare the market value of draft picks with the historical value of drafted players.
We find that top draft picks are overvalued in a manner that is inconsistent with rational expectations and
efficient markets and consistent with psychological research.

OK, simple English now: Teams overvalue the right to choose. More on that later. Now, as promised, the link to the entire article. If you're a good reader with a good education, this is about a 4 beer read. If you're hooked on phonics, you might want to break it up into a couple of days. And it's got lots of hard math.....you know, the kind with a lot of Greek letters instead of numbers. If I were you, I'd skip the link and just read the analysis I'll post later, but it's up to you. Freedom of choice is what made this country great.

http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~cadem/bio/massey%20&%20thaler%20-%20loser's%20curse.pdf
Now, here's some of the discussion we had about it:

Key here is "Overvalue the right to choose." Their reference to the NYG orgasm over Eli Manning fits here. That’s where TT could parlay our #5 overall into a bonanza if the right player were there. It also means that our win against the Seahawks in the finale was costly indeed….massively so, as you'll see below and especially if you read the report.

This is where I think the psychology of GMs comes into play--where some GMs so crave the desire to move up for a certain player that they'll do it even if it makes no sense to do so.

NFL teams face exactly this kind of task when they predict the future performance of college players – they must combine evidence about the player’s ability (his college statistics, scouting reports, fitness tests, etc.) with the prior probabilities of various levels of NFL performance to reach a forecast. For example, over their first five years, players drafted in the first round spend about as many seasons out of the league (8%) or not starting a single game (8%) as in the Pro Bowl (9%). To the extent that the evidence about an individual player is highly diagnostic of a player’s NFL future, prior probabilities such as these can be given less weight. However, if the evidence is imperfectly related to future performance, then teams should “regress” player forecasts toward the prior probabilities. If teams act as Kahneman & Tversky’s subjects did, they will rely too heavily on evidence they accumulate on college players. Indeed, to be regressive is to admit to a limited ability to differentiate the good from the great, and it is this skill that has secured NFL scouts and general managers their jobs.

Check out that stat about the 1st five years….scary.

In the final months before the draft almost all players are put through additional drills designed to test their speed, strength, agility, intelligence, etc. While one might think such information can only improve a team’s judgment about a player, the research just described suggests otherwise. Rather, as teams compile information about players, their confidence in their ability to discriminate between them might outstrip any true improvement in their judgment.

This paragraph appeared in the section entitled “Overconfidence,” in which an assertion is made that people’s thoughts and judgments about a player are given more weight than fact--ie: human bias. To this point, are they referencing the “workout warriors” that people fall in love with above?

Harrison & Bazerman (1995) point out that non-regressive predictions, the winner’s curse, and expectation inflation have a common underlying cause – the role of uncertainty and individuals’ failure to account for it. The authors emphasize that these problems are exacerbated when uncertainty increases and when the number of alternatives increase. The NFL draft is a textbook example of such a situation – teams select among hundreds of alternative players, there are typically many teams interested in any given player, and there is significant uncertainty about the future value of the player.

Other than trying to reduce the uncertainty in their predictive models (which is both expensive and of limited potential), teams have little control over these factors. If teams recognize the situation, they will hedge their bids for particular players, reducing the value they place on choosing one player over another. But if they are susceptible to these biases, they will “bid” highly for players, overvaluing the right to choose early.

In other words, the draft is a crapshoot and you shouldn't have an orgasm over any one player because the VALUE isn't worth it in almost EVERY documented instance.

Their analysis on trading, which I recommend everyone read (even though the formulas and statistical complexity of their analysis is staggering), is fascinating. I’ll try to summarize here.

(see part 2)

CHFF Look At The Packers In Free Agency

2007-03-18T08:37:42Z

You may be getting the idea that CHFF is one of my favorite places to get material. You're right. Here's another one which was part of a longer piece on NFC North Free Agency.

GREEN BAY (8-8)

2006 rankings

Total O	Score O	Rush O	Pass O	Total D	Score D	Rush D	Pass D
14	22	23	9	12	25	13	17

2006 Quality Stat rankings

Scoreability	Off. Hog	Pass YPA	Bendability	Def. Hog	Def. Pass Rating
27	10	17	29	6t	8

Free agent signed:

CB Frank Walker (N.Y. Giants)

C Tyson Walter (re-signed)

LB Tracy White (re-signed))

Free agents lost:

RB Ahman Green (Houston)

TE David Martin (Miami)

Free-agency status: Sinking

Green Bay's biggest move so far this offseason exists only in the unreliable ether of Rumorville -- a trade for WR Randy Moss. While the addition of Moss would certainly bring a new dimension to the Packer offense (assuming, and this is a big one, that Moss returns to form), it wouldn't exactly fix all of the Packer ills.

Starting tailback Ahman Green (gone to Houston) averaged just 4.0 yards per carry last year and is 30. But none of the other tailbacks in the league who have changed addresses have wound up in Green Bay. Either the Pack really liked what they saw from Vernand Morency (421 yards, 4.6 average), or they'll be one of the main movers for RBs on Draught Day. Backup TE David Martin was also a loss, although the Packers still have Bubba Franks and Donald Lee at the position.

Green Bay's defense showed flashes of decency last year, ranking well on the defensive line and in the secondary (as measured by defensive passer rating). But they were a bend-then-break bunch, ranking 29th in our Bendability Index. Fixing the inability to keep people out of the end zone is not an easy task, but it's safe to say that adding a nickel back like Frank Walker (five INTs in four NFL seasons) isn't going to do it.

2006 Quarterback Rankings

2007-03-16T09:30:10Z

The guy who runs the blog over at www.pro-football-reference is a pretty darn solid number cruncher, IMO, and he frequently attempts to apply formulas that quantify the performance of various players while taking into account the numerous variables that apply. Whether you think he's on target or off base is up to each person to decide for themselves, but IMO he's about as on-target as is objectively possible.

Anyway, today he has a 2006 QB rating up, so I thought I'd borrow/steal it for my own purposes and put it in my weblog so I could reference it whenever I wanted.

BTW....this guy does take financial donations to "sponsor a page", and I'd encourage people to take him up on his offer because I don't think there's another website out there that does anything like what he offers. It's worth supporting.

Here's the article:

Posted by Chase Stuart on Wednesday, March 14, 2007

Over the summer, we looked at the worst and best passers since the NFL merger. With 2006 in the books, a supplement to those blogs became necessary.

As a group, NFL QBs averaged 5.825 adjusted yards per attempt in 2006, which is in line with prior data. For those needing a quick refresher, here’s how we score each QB. Adjusted yards per attempt is calculated by taking a QB’s passing yards, subtracting 45 yards for every INT, adding 10 yards for every passing TD, and dividing by total pass attempts. Then we take the difference between the individual’s adjusted yards per attempt and the league average, and multiply by total attempts (this is because a great QB that throws 500 times is more valuable than a great QB that throws 400 times.)

Here’s a list of how many points each QB scored last year (only those with 100 attempts shown here):

1058	Peyton Manning		7.72
956	Drew Brees		7.55
756	Marc Bulger		7.11
716	Donovan McNabb		8.09
701	Carson Palmer		7.17
545	Tony Romo		         7.44
524	Philip Rivers		6.96
522	Damon Huard		7.96
233	Kurt Warner		7.21
224	Jeff Garcia		7.02
223	Tom Brady		         6.26
175	Mark Brunell		6.50
112	J.P. Losman		6.09
110	Tim Rattay		6.91
 68	Jay Cutler		6.32
 33	Daunte Culpepper	         6.07
 26	David Garrard		5.93
-23	Chad Pennington		5.78
-31	Jake Delhomme		5.75
-44	Jon Kitna		         5.75
-56	Steve McNair		5.71
-62	Byron Leftwich		5.49
-74	Ben Roethlisberger    	5.67
-79	Jason Campbell		5.44
-79	Matt Leinart		5.62
-110	Drew Bledsoe		5.17
-129	Seneca Wallace		4.91
-146	Trent Green		5.09
-171	Michael Vick		5.38
-199	Derek Anderson		4.13
-214	Matt Hasselbeck		5.25
-238	David Carr		5.29
-245	Alex Smith		5.27
-273	Rex Grossman		5.26
-316	Brett Favre		5.31
-328	Jake Plummer		4.79
-337	Chris Simms		2.64
-343	Aaron Brooks		4.04
-346	Vince Young		4.86
-367	Eli Manning		5.12
-392	Brad Johnson		4.93
-486	Andrew Walter		4.07
-494	Charlie Frye		4.56
-565	Bruce Gradkowski	         4.10
-579	Joey Harrington		4.33

Thoughts
Jay Cutler played better than Jake Plummer, yet some people still pin the Broncos lost post-season hopes on the mid-season switch. I maintain that the real error was not making the switch soon enough.

Damon Huard had an incredible year, while Trent Green was below average. Tony Romo played better than I remembered. The Eagles three QBs (1091) actually topped Manning, who was the only Colts QB to throw a pass in 2006. Jason Campbell wasn’t half bad, but Mark Brunell was better. Matt Leinart wasn’t as good as Kurt Warner, and Alex Smith was only good compared to his 2005 version. Rex Grossman, Brett Favre and Eli Manning are polarizing figures, but all of them were below average passers in 2006. And Joey Harrington is still terrible (more on this later).

Changes to the All Time list
Peyton Manning now has 5,985 career points of value, vaulting him from 7th to 4th all time. Kurt Warner and Trent Green flip-flopped, and Warner is now 8th and Green 9th on the career list. Brett Favre continued his free-fall, from 15th to now 20th on the list; conversely, Marc Bulger jumped up from 31st to 21st. Donovan McNabb leaped from 52nd to 29th. Matt Hasselbeck was 28th and Drew Brees 81st before the season began; now they’re 42nd and 43rd, respectively. And Carson Palmer snuck into the top fifty.

On to the negative side: Mike Vick dropped to below average for his career with a bad 2006. Drew Bledsoe continues to slide, and is at -574 for his career. Charlie Frye (-671), Alex Smith (-809), Eli Manning (-850) and David Carr (-988) have some work to do to resurrect their careers.

Jake Plummer (-1425), Kerry Collins (-1461) and Jon Kitna (-1495) continue to produce below average work but are always given another chance. At least Kitna was just about average last year.

And then there was Joey. After another miserable season, Harrington now stands as The Worst QB Of All Time (-2,953). This was Harrington’s third season of negative 500 points or greater (fewer?). Rick Mirer, you have been surpassed.

2006 Notables, under 100 pass attempts: Charlie Batch (+233), A.J. Feeley (+151), Kyle Boller (+125), Chris Weinke (-94), Tarvaris Jackson (-157) and Kerry Collins (-235) all had significant impacts despite limited playing time. And Brodie Croyle (-108) got into the triple digits on only seven pass attempts; he was 3/7 for 23 yards with two interceptions.

Offseason Personnel and Building Your Team

2007-03-14T09:58:59Z

This morning, on my morning rounds through the various football/Packers websites, some themes lined up in a perfect constellation and I had a moment of clarity.

First, the retiring Cliff Christl expounded at length on his favorite theme......that you have to have good players to win.   And not just good players......SPECIAL players.   He points out that pretty much every team that wins the Super Bowl has special players (so do teams that don't win the Super Bowl). And he points out that special players are overwhelmingly found in the first part of the first round and puts the odds at the Packers getting a "special player" at #16 at somewhere between 1.6% and 17%.......let's split the difference and call it a 10% shot at best and probably more like 5%.

He also opines that getting a special player late in the draft, like Terrell Davis or Tom Brady, happens so rarely that it's best not to even consider it.   And special players are almost always drafted, never traded for or acquired in free agency.

If you really buy into this theory, then you'd trade away all your picks to move up and take your best shot at a special player every year and then flesh out your squad with FAs and undrafted rookies.    Because it isn't about getting solid, quality starters in rounds 2-3-4-5, it's about getting that super-duper player in round 1......because without him, you simply do not win the Super Bowl.

That's not my theory, and be patient, I'm getting to it........

The second item of note was the mock draft over at nfl.com by Pat Kirwan.    Now, I like Kirwan and think he's pretty knowledgable, even if he did borrow my idea for an article several years ago (it was one about how QBs drafted in the first round almost never win the Super Bowl for the team that drafted them unless they were the #1 overall pick).    And he's got a mock draft out today that parallels a lot of the mocks out there.    You see in the first round, he:

1)Picks SIX defensive ends and only two offensive tackles. Now, I have commented several times on the reality that good DEs don't get much done against good OTs, and that you're probably ahead spending your picks on OTs instead of DEs, but the allure of that irrestible forcecoming off the edge and smother the QB is just much too glamorous to eschew in favor of the immovable object in his way.    In fact, given that year in and year out the team that wins the Super Bowl has a dominant offensive line, you'd think that teams would invest more heavily in the road graders that make it happen, but nope......let's just keep going for those sack artists because one sack lasts longer in your memory than the 65 effective blocks that preceded it.

The Bears had a pretty good defensive line last year......but it didn't look like it against that Colt offensive line in the Super Bowl, did it?

2)Selects 5 WRs in the first round.   Now, the coldhardfootballfacts.com has done exhaustive research into this and they have arrived at the inescapable conclusion that the vast, overhwhelming majority of WRs taken in the first round never amount to much in this league.   But again, the allure of that leaping, twisting catch and subsequent run for the TD that we see on ESPN Hilights keeps us chasing that fools gold.   Here's a clue: Most touchdowns in the NFL come from starting on a short field and moving the ball downfield with high percentage plays.  Very few WRs have been "difference makers" in the playoffs on any consistent basis. In fact, the very best WRs of the last decade, Randy Moss, Terrell Owens, and Marvin Harrison have exactly one Super Bowl ring among them....in a game where he caught two passes.

I told you to be patient. Here's my theory:   Games, especially playoff games, are won by teams that can

1)Control the line of scrimmage
2)Run effectively
3)Protect the ball.
4)Play defense.

So if I'm drafting, I'm drafting with that in mind and I'm drafting guys that help in those areas, and WRs and speedy edge rushers don't help in any of those areas.

The third item was the continuing Randy Moss saga. Now, I think that for the Packers, acquiring Randy Moss is a historically bad idea on several levels that I've commented on at length here and elsewhere.     Even assuming that he's still "got it" (which I don't assume) and even assuming that he'll "behave himself" (which I don't assume)........how does Randy Moss help us control the line of scrimmage, protect the ball, or run effectively?

Well, if he's still "got it" it would tend to keep the safeties deep and that would have an effect on the run game, but I don't think that's why the Fawning Legion of Adoring Worshipers wants Moss so much.   I think that fantasizing about Favre throwing long jump balls downfield and Randy Moss outjumping the defender for a long reception gives them such a collective woody that they don't for a second stop to consider how many of those balls will be incompletes or interceptions that kill drives and force us to punt.

But I'm beginning to be resigned to the notion that Moss will be a Packer, probably sometime this summer after Al Davis lowers his asking price.    Davis may be stubborn but he's no fool and he realizes that he's got to cut Moss out of the body of this team in order to cure the cancer and eventually he'll decide that addition by subtraction is the dynamic in play.    And then Ted Thompson will step up to make the second serious blunder of his tenure here with the Packers and bring Moss on board.    The perverse bastard in me can't wait for it all to turn to shit so I can say "I told you so".

But the Packer fan in me desperately hopes that the Packers don't do that, and that they spend their draft picks on guys that help in those four areas I mentioned above.

QB	RB	WR	OL	DL	LB	DB
947.6 (21st)	72.5 (32nd)	3472 (13th)	2277.3 (21st)	3282.3 (21st)	3034.4 (7th)	3564.6 (13th)